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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of social capital (trust) vis-à-vis the propensity of a country to be a tax 
haven. The empirical analysis corroborates that better governed countries have a higher ceteris paribus 
probability to be tax havens. However, social capital counteracts the effect of governance quality. This 
effect is so strong that the partial effect of governance quality is reversed for countries with the trust 
index in the top quartile – making these high trust countries less likely to be tax havens – even as 
governance quality is increased. Thus it is crucial to consider the interaction between institutions and 
social capital, since the same governance institutions have a different impact on the tax haven 
propensity for countries with different social capital. 
Keywords: tax havens, governance, institutions, trust, social capital. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper broadens our understanding of why some countries choose to be tax havens by 
investigating the role of social capital (trust) and its interaction with governance quality. The analysis 
corroborates previous findings that tax havens are small, affluent, and have high-quality governance 
institutions (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009) and expands our knowledge of tax haven determinants by 
showing that social capital counteracts the effects of governance quality. Countries with higher levels of 
general trust have a significantly lower probability of being tax havens if they also have high 
governance quality. 
In recent years, research on tax havens has proliferated (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009; Palan et al. 
2010; Rawlings, 2004; Rixen, 2011; Sharman, 2012; Shaxson, 2012). One branch of this literature 
focuses on international policies against tax competition (Sharman 2006). Another branch focuses on 
the development of tax havens and their role in the global economy (Palan et al. 2010; Shaxson 2012). 
A third branch, investigates the determinants of tax havens (Dharmapala and Hines 2006, 2009). This 
paper builds directly on Dharmapala and Hines (2009) by highlighting how the tax haven propensity 
changes with the interaction between governance quality and social capital. We thus contribute to the 
literature on the determinants of tax havens by highlighting the importance of social capital and its 
interaction with governance institution quality. Social capital has been found to be important for 
economic outcomes such as economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997), institutional design and 
performance (Djankov et al., 2003), financial development (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004, 2008), 
crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1995), firm size (La Porta et al., 1997), secondary 
education (Goldin and Katz, 2001), and family ties (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010). We document its 
importance vis-à-vis tax haven status. 
There is a substantial theoretical literature on the attractiveness for a country to be a tax haven 
(Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Hansen and Kesser, 2001; Slemrod and Wilson, 2009).  Several characteristics 
of tax havens are well-documented in the literature: Tax havens are usually small countries with a 
population below one million and more prosperous than other countries (Dharmapala and Hines 2006, 
2009). Dharmapala and Hines (2009) further document that governance quality has a statistically 
significant effect on the probability of being a tax haven. This suggests that the range of a country's 
sensible tax policy options is constrained by the quality of its governance institutions, since better 
governed countries are more likely to be tax havens. We show that the effect of governance quality is 
counteracted – even reversed – by social capital, as countries with a high level of trust tend to be less 
likely to be tax havens and have a significantly lower effect of higher governance quality. This result is 
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driven by the supply side, since even as demand for offshore financial services increases with 
governance quality, the willingness to supply such services decreases even more as equity and fairness 
concerns become more important locally. This could be because high levels of trust indicate high trust 
in institutions to perform redistributive and other social objectives. This also suggests that a country’s 
tax policy options can be subject to a more cultural or social constraint. In light of this result, it is 
pivotal to consider the interaction between institutions (governance quality) and social capital (trust), 
since the same institutions have different impact on the tax haven propensity for countries with different 
social capital. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data, the empirical results are 
presented in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes. 
2.  Data 
The empirical analysis investigates the role of social capital and governance vis-à-vis the propensity 
to be a tax haven. We expand the dataset used by Dharmapala and Hines (2009) with a measure of 
social capital, namely the trust index from the World Values Survey (WVS)2, the European Values 
Study (EVS), and the GlobalBarometer Surveys (GBR). The trust index is constructed from the question 
of interpersonal trust, usually asked in the following terms: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”, where we focus 
on the two feasible answers “most people can be trusted” and “can’t be too careful”. The trust index is 
given by: 
Trust Index  =  1 + (% most people can be trusted) - (% can’t be too careful)                     (1) 
Hence, an index higher than one corresponds to countries where a majority of people trust others, 
while an index lower than one corresponds to countries where a majority of people think one can never 
be too careful when dealing with others. This social capital measure appears stable over time and the 
merged index is the country average over survey waves during the period 1995-2009. 
The Dharmapala and Hines (2009) dataset includes a governance index, also labeled the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) and developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005).3 The 
components of the measurement of governance quality are based on the following six dimensions: (1) 
 
2
 WVS has executed five waves of surveys from 1981 to 2008. Representative national samples are interviewed, using a 
standardized questionnaire that measures changing values concerning e.g. social capital. For more information on WVS; 
see www.worldvaluessurvey.org, EVS; see www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu, and GBR; see www.globalbarometers.org. 
3
 The WGI indicators are available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. Including a description and 
response to critics of the WGI indicators at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm. 
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Voice and Accountability – measuring political, civil and human rights. (2) Political Instability and 
Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes in, government, including 
terrorism. (3) Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality 
of public service delivery. (4) Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly 
policies. (5) Rule of Law – measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. (6) Control of Corruption – measuring the exercise of 
public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state capture.  
Following Dharmapala and Hines (2009) our empirical analysis includes five of the above governance 
dimensions. The regulatory dimension is excluded from the analysis because some of the underlying 
measures used to calculate regulatory quality are directly related to a country’s tax system, and may 
therefore be mechanically correlated with tax rates and tax haven status. The remaining five dimensions 
are aggregated into a composite governance index for each country, using the unweighted mean of the 
available measures in 2004. 
Tax havens are defined the same way as in Dharmapala and Hines (2009). Thus the analysis uses as 
its definition a list of 41 countries and territories provided in Appendix 2 of Hines and Rice (1994, p. 
178). The dependent variable in the analysis is an indicator variable for whether or not a country is 
classified as a tax haven. The explanatory variables of primary interest here are the measures of social 
capital and governance quality as specified above, namely the trust index and the governance index. The 
data also includes several other control variables and summary statistics are presented in Table 1. They 
show similar patterns as previous research (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009) and suggest that tax havens 
are small, affluent, likely to be islands, and large proportions of their population lives close to coasts. 
They have open economies, and are physically close to major capital exporters. Moreover, they are less 
likely to have Scandinavian and Socialist origins, and more likely to have British legal origins and 
parliamentary systems, to use English as an official language, and to have substantially smaller natural 
resources than non-havens. 
As also noted by Dharmapala and Hines (2009), one of the most striking differences in Table 1 is that 
tax havens have a substantially higher governance index than non-havens, suggesting that strong 
governance institutions is almost a prerequisite for becoming a tax haven. Table 1 confirms that the 
characteristics of the tax havens and non-havens are similar for the sample of countries with non-
missing trust index. We further examine whether the trust index is non-randomly missing from the full 
sample of countries and territories by regressing an indicator of missing values on the country 
characteristics, as well as imputing the trust index where missing in the empirical analysis. All in all, 
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this does not give us reason to worry about sample selection issues, as it does not significantly affect our 
main empirical result. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Tax Havens and Nonhavens. 
 
Note: The table displays descriptive statistics of independent variables of main interest (i.e. governance and trust index), instrumental variables, and 
control variables separately by tax haven status. Mean (standard deviation) and fraction of sample for indicator variables. 
  
Havens - 
Nonhavens
N Mean (Std.Dev.) N Mean (Std.Dev.) Mean Diff.
Governance Index 33 0.73 (0.72) 176 -0.13 (0.90) 0.86
Trust Index 11 0.53 (0.22) 103 0.50 (0.27) 0.04
Confidence in Institutions Index 11 0.99 (0.36) 102 0.86 (0.35) 0.14
Confidence in Welfare System Index 9 1.14 (0.20) 86 1.02 (0.09) 0.12
Cheat-Tax Index (1 versus 10) 9 1.62 (0.15) 82 1.59 (0.17) 0.03
Cheat-Tax Index (1-5 versus 6-10) 9 1.81 (0.11) 82 1.79 (0.13) 0.03
UN subregions:
  Trust Index 36 0.46 (0.21) 162 0.47 (0.24) -0.02
  Confidence in Institutions Index 36 0.76 (0.32) 162 0.88 (0.32) -0.12
  Confidence in Welfare System Index 36 1.05 (0.12) 162 1.01 (0.07) 0.04
Legal origins:
  Trust Index 39 0.47 (0.06) 189 0.48 (0.13) -0.01
  Confidence in Institutions Index 39 0.99 (0.14) 189 0.87 (0.15) 0.12
  Confidence in Welfare System Index 39 1.02 (0.01) 189 1.03 (0.02) 0.00
Control variables:
  GDP per capita (PPP, thousands USD) 39 18.51 (14.68) 188 9.55 (10.22) 8.96
  Population (thousands) 39 1,146 (2,043) 189 33,354 (126,476) -32,208
  UN member 39 0.67 189 0.87 -0.21
  Distance by air (km) 39 2,965 (1,899) 189 4,429 (2,645) -1,464
  Landlocked 39 0.10 189 0.20 -0.09
Regional controls:
  Asia / Pacific 39 0.18 189 0.22 -0.04
  Europé and Central Asia 39 0.26 189 0.24 0.02
  the Americas 39 0.44 189 0.18 0.26
  Middle East and Africa 39 0.13 189 0.35 -0.22
Instrumental Variables:
  Latitude (abs. value) 31 0.28 (0.17) 176 0.28 (0.19) 0.00
  British legal origin 39 0.72 186 0.30 0.42
  French legal origin 39 0.23 186 0.46 -0.23
  German legal origin 39 0.05 186 0.03 0.02
  Scandinavian legal origin 39 0.00 186 0.03 -0.03
  Socialist legal origin 39 0.00 186 0.18 -0.18
Tax Havens Nonhavens
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3.  Empirical Results and Interpretation 
In this section we analyze the relationship between governance, trust, and tax haven status in more 
detail. There is a high positive correlation between the governance and the trust index (0.49). Likewise, 
GDP per capital (which is found to be a determinant of tax haven status) is highly correlated with both 
the governance (0.86) and the trust index (0.45). We employ a regression analysis in an attempt to 
control for various factors that may be highly correlated with both tax haven status and the explanatory 
variables of main interest, namely governance and trust, and thus confound the regression estimates. 
Table 2 presents the key findings of the empirical analysis. We corroborate the positive relationship 
between governance quality and tax haven status in the sample of 209 countries and territories used by 
Dharmapala and Hines (2009), but the relationship is weaker in the sample of 114 countries for which 
the trust index exists.4 We document that countries with higher levels of trust have a significantly lower 
impact of governance quality on the probability of being a tax haven.5  
Table 2. Determinants of Tax Haven Status. 
 
Note: Dependent Variable: Indicator for Tax Haven Status (=1 for Tax Havens). All regressions include Control Variables for region, GDP per capita, 
population, UN member, landlocked, and distance by air. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Similar control variables and robustness checks are applied in this analysis as in Dharmapala and 
Hines (2009). The control variables in the baseline regressions include: GDP per capita, population, UN 
member, landlocked, distance by air, and regional controls. The robustness checks also include: the 
country’s land area, whether it is an island, fraction of population within 100 km of the coast, 
parliamentary systems, use of English as an official language, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, telephone lines per capita, and exogenous natural 
resource endowment (subsoil assets). Our main result is neither sensitive to including all these nor 
groups of these additional control variables. Similar results are yielded when estimating the baseline 
regressions on subsamples of UN members, countries with a high GDP per capital, and small countries. 
 
4
 The countries with missing trust index are smaller territories, less likely to be UN members, more likely to be 
Asian/Pacific, and have lower governance quality on average. 
5
 Replacing the linear additive form of the governance and trust index with an indicator for having a governance and 
trust index in the top quartile in specification (2) shows that countries with both the governance and the trust index in 
the top quartile have a 32 percentage points lower probability of being tax havens. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Governance Index 0.1188 *** 0.0983 0.2322 *** 0.2711 *** 0.1189 0.2526 *** 0.2819 *** 0.0982 0.2920 *** 0.3157 *** 1.3761 *** 1.7155 ***
(0.0418) (0.0855) (0.0715) (0.0741) (0.0837) (0.0694) (0.0710) (0.0879) (0.0752) (0.0767) (0.4154) (0.6169)
Trust Index -0.0593 -0.0392 0.1184 -0.0774 -0.0858 0.0994 -0.0606 -0.0025 0.1209 2.3349 * 3.0039 *
(0.1405) (0.1506) (0.1577) (0.1360) (0.1442) (0.1506) (0.1477) (0.1570) (0.1656) (1.1558) (1.6585)
Trust * Governance Index -0.0017 * -0.2231 ** -0.2854 ** -0.0019 ** -0.2676 *** -0.3069 *** -0.0017 -0.2742 *** -0.3163 *** -2.0403 ** -2.9038 **
(0.0010) (0.1059) (0.1159) (0.0010) (0.1017) (0.1103) (0.0011) (0.1093) (0.1188) (0.8386) (1.2085)
Trust Index (UN subregion) + + + +
Trust Index (legal origin) + + + +
Number of observations 209 114 184 209 111 170 191 109 169 191 39 56
All Countries and Territories UN members GDP/capita ≥ USD1000 Population ≤ 1 mill
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The positive relationship between governance and tax haven status and its interaction with trust tend to 
be even stronger for small countries, while trust even has a positive and significant partial effect on the 
tax haven propensity for smaller countries. This result is in line with Dharmapala and Hines (2009) and 
Hansen and Kessler (2001) arguing that it is more socially acceptable for smaller countries to lower tax 
rates, but the sample size is very small so this is a cautious conclusion. 
To increase sample size we also include specifications where the trust index has been replaced by the 
UN subregion average and the average for countries with same legal origin.6 Comparative case studies 
document the importance of region – particularly the attitude of the metropole for dependencies 
considering to become tax havens (Joensen et al., 2013) and legal origins have been found to be 
important for various social and economic outcomes – including financial development (La Porta et al., 
1997, 1998; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). The positive partial effect of governance quality and the 
negative partial effect of its interaction with trust just become even stronger in these specifications. Our 
results are thus both to both aggregation on region and legal origin.7  
4.  Conclusion and Further Research 
This paper documents a crucial interaction between social capital and governance quality. Particularly 
having a high level of trust in the country counteracts the effects of strong governance institutions. 
Countries with both strong governance and high levels of trust have a 32 percentage points lower 
probability of being tax havens. The main results are largely robust to looking at subgroups of countries, 
imputing the missing values of the trust index, including additional control variables, and employing an 
IV strategy with latitude and legal origins as instruments for the trust and governance index.  
The analysis gives rise to a number of new research questions. In particular, it triggers the question 
why the presence of high levels of trust counteracts the probability of tax haven activities in countries or 
territories otherwise prone to be tax havens? One possible explanation could be that high levels of trust 
indicate high trust in institutions to perform redistributive and other objectives, as well as more “pro-
social” behavior (more solidarity). Since tax havens are often associated with being “anti-social” (Palan 
et al. 2010; Shaxson 2012), countries characterized with high levels of trust (social capital) refrain from 
 
6
 No trust index is available for the UN subregions: Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia, and Middle Africa. 
7
 We so employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation strategy, where we instrument governance with legal origin, 
trust with absolute latitude, and their interaction with the instrument interactions. The IV results are consistent with our 
main finding, but the instruments are weak and consequently the estimates are imprecise. Provided that legal origins and 
latitude do not directly impact tax haven status – other than their impact on governance and trust – the IV estimates give 
consistent estimates of the effect of governance and trust. These estimates should thus be free of bias caused by 
correlation between unobserved factors affecting tax haven status and the governance quality and the trust level, 
respectively. Our conclusions are also robust to using a probit and a Heckman type correction model instead of OLS 
and 2SLS, respectively. Results are not tabulated here, but available upon request. 
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tax haven activities perhaps because of conforming to social norms and on a basis of logic of 
appropriateness (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). These mechanisms tend to only exist when governance 
quality also is high – most likely because institutions then are capable of performing their 
(redistributive) objectives. In this regard it is a striking fact that no countries with Scandinavian and 
Socialist legal origins are tax havens, suggesting that perhaps some welfare regimes are less prone to 
become tax havens than others – with the Scandinavian model being perhaps the least likely type of 
regime to become a tax haven (Esping-Andersen, 1990). These hypotheses would be interesting to test 
more directly in future research. Our results are consistent with an economic model whereby the supply 
of OFC services decreases with the level of social capital in the economy and the foreign demand of 
OFC services increases with governance quality. In such a model, the tax haven probability will increase 
(decrease) as governance quality (trust) increases; thus, the partial effect of governance quality will 
depend on the level of trust. The results in Table 2 show that it is even reversed; thus, the interaction 
between governance and trust cannot be ignored when analyzing the determinants of tax havens. This is 
a complex interaction that would be interesting to explore further in future research. 
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